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In affirming a conviction for receiving stolen goods, the
South Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Broome,I held that it
was not error for the solicitor to use his notes of an earlier conver-
sation with a juvenile witness to elicit additional incriminating
statements made to the juvenile by defendant. The witness and
two other youths had stolen several containers of old coins and
later sold them to defendant at a discount. When apprehended
by police, the juvenile admitted the theft and divulged defen-
dant's purchase of stolen property. Defendant subsequently was
arrested for receiving stolen goods.
At trial the juvenile testified on direct examination that de-
fendant had said, "[D]on't steal from the poor and give to the
rich; steal from the rich and give to the poor."'2 In an effort to
prompt further incriminating testimony, the solicitor offered the
witness a paper on which the solicitor had written certain parts
of an earlier discussion between them. He subsequently testified
that defendant had also said, "[D]on't tell anybody, you know,
that we made this deal tonight," and, "[D]on't tell me any
thing, the less I know the less I worry." 3 The jury found defendant
guilty of receiving stolen goods.
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed Broome's conviction.
Defendant asserted error in the solicitor's use of his notes to re-
fresh the juvenile witness' memory. The court's response reiter-
ated the rule that "because it is the recollection of the witness and
not the memorandum that is in evidence, it is not incumbent that
the refreshing material be made by the witness himself,"' and
concluded that "the record amply reflects that the juvenile testi-
fied from his memory independently and apart from the source
of refreshment."5
In line with the majority of jurisdictions, the court clearly
distinguished between the two situations often referred to as re-
freshing recollection.' In the first situation, after seeing the mem-
orandum, the witness speaks from his own refreshed memory, and
1. 268 S.C. 99, 232 S.E.2d 324 (1977).
2. Id. at 102, 232 S.E.2d at 325.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 103 n.1, 232 S.E.2d at 325 n.1.
5. Id. at 103, 232 S.E.2d at 325.
6. Id. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 9 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK].
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depends upon his present recollection of the facts. Use of the
memorandum is permitted, regardless of when and by whom it
was made. In the second, the witness cannot remember the facts
independently and relies solely upon the paper as an accurate
record of a past memory. Use of the memorandum is not permit-
ted in this situation unless the witness himself made the original
contemporaneously with the events to which it refers.7
In applying these rules the court in Broome determined that
the record reflected a situation of the first type in which the
witness speaks from his own memory. While one may question
whether the record truly reflected an independent recollection by
the witness, this crucial determination seemed well-founded to
the court based on the record presented. Because the juvenile
witness' testimony, in the court's view, was independent of the
solicitor's notes and was his own recollection of defendant's state-
ments to him, Broome is consistent with earlier South Carolina
case law on refreshing memory.'
Broome serves to illustrate by negative example the necessity
for adequate witness preparation before trial. Ideally, counsel re-
freshes the memory of the witness by reviewing the relevant data
prior to the court appearance. If, however, the witness is still
unable to recall facts while testifying, counsel may resort to using
memoranda to refresh memory on the stand? The practitioner
should employ this practice only when compelled by necessity
because a jury may lose confidence in a witness' testimony.'0 A
jury also may look more favorably upon use of memoranda pre-
pared by the witness rather than notes written by counsel.
7. In contrast to the rule in South Carolina and the majority of jurisdictions, the
minority rule makes no distinction between writings used to refresh present memory and
requirements for records of past recollection. In both instances, under the minority rule,
use of refreshing memoranda is restricted by requirements of authorship, guaranty of
correctness, and time of making. See MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 9 at 15.
After examination of the two views on refreshing memory, Wigmore endorsed the
majority rule. 3 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 725-65 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as WIGMORE]. Dean McCormick, recognizing the fallibility of memory, believed that when
refreshing memory the additional requirements of authorship and timing "have a plausi-
ble basis in expediency;" however, he felt that the majority rule can work well in practice
because other sufficient safeguards exist to protect against abuse. MCCORMICK, supra note
6, § 9, at 16-17.
8. See, e.g., Copeland Co. v. Davis, 125 S.C. 449, 119 S.E. 19 (1923); Gwathmey v.
Foor Hotel Co., 121 S.C. 237, 113 S.E. 688 (1922).
9. The South Carolina attorney when practicing in federal courts may use Rule 612
of the Federal Rules of Evidence as a guide to procedures for refreshing memory with a
writing. FED. R. EVID. 612. See also Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 612.
10. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 9, at 15.
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II. USE OF BLACKBOARDS
An unusual use of a blackboard to list claims prompted the
South Carolina Supreme Court to reverse and remand the lower
court's decision in Ballard v. Rowe," holding that submission of
the blackboard exhibit to the jury was so prejudicial that a new
trial was required. The controversy centered around two contracts
for construction of a shrimp boat. Defendants-appellants William
D. and Robert I. Player, the boat owners, had employed
defendant-respondent W. E. Rowe, the general contractor, to
build a boat. In turn, Rowe subcontracted virtually the entire job
of building the shrimp boat to plaintiff Lee C. Ballard, III. Bal-
lard subsequently brought suit against the Players and Rowe for
amounts due under the subcontract and for incidental and extra
expenses for additions and changes beyond the subcontract speci-
fications. The Players and Rowe cross-claimed against each
other. Rowe contended that $25,839.46 was still owed under the
general contract. The Players, however, asserted that they owed
nothing because Rowe had failed to carry out the contract.
At trial, after the judge had concluded jury instructions and
had sent the jury to deliberate, the jurors returned to the court-
room to ask for an itemized list of extra work and materials that
plaintiff claimed against defendant Rowe. When counsel for both
plaintiff and Rowe agreed and counsel for the Players did not
object, the requested items were written on a blackboard out of
the jury's presence.
The actions that followed provided the basis of the successful
appeal to the supreme court. Over Players' objection, defendant
Rowe's counsel added a column to the blackboard listing repre-
senting Rowe's cross-claims against the Players for extra labor
and materials beyond the general contract requirements. Before
revealing any lists to the jurors, the judge asked whether they also
wanted an itemization of the extra labor and materials claimed
by Rowe against the Players. The foreman answered yes and the
trial judge, again over objection from Players' counsel, permitted
jurors to see both blackboard listings and to take the blackboard
into the jury room. The jury returned verdicts of $12,596.89 in
favor of Ballard against Rowe and $19,914.35 on the cross-claim
in favor of Rowe against the Players.
On appeal, counsel for the Players renewed objections made
at trial asserting that the trial judge erred in allowing submission




Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
of the blackboard itemizations to the jurors after all evidence was
before the court. They contended that certain blackboard figures
were not supported by the evidence and that allowing jurors to
take the blackboard into the jury room "was tantamount to intro-
ducing evidence after the case was closed and unduly emphasized
the claims and contentions of [Rowel."12
Rowe, however, argued that evidence in the record supported
the blackboard figures, that permitting use of the blackboard lists
was properly within the trial judge's discretion, and that even if
error was present, it was harmless error because exactly the same
figures were listed for the claims between Ballard and Rowe with-
out objection from the Players. 3 Citing Johnson v. Charleston
and Western Carolina Railway,4 Indemnity Insurance Co. of
North America v. Odom,'5 and Edwards v. Lawton, ' 6 Rowe estab-
lished the propriety of counsel's use of a blackboard during the
jury argument to illustrate points, to calculate damages, or to
clarify other facts or figures properly arguable. Rowe's counsel
conceded that Ballard could be distinguished from these cases
because the blackboard was present in the jury room during de-
liberations in the Ballard trial, but argued that during delibera-
tions jurors at times are allowed to use notes or papers not intro-
duced into evidence." Counsel failed, however, to cite any author-
ity for the propriety of utilizing blackboard lists compiled after
the close of the case. A valid distinction should be drawn between
the use of blackboards as an aid during jury arguments and the
unorthodox use of blackboards in Ballard because, as stated in
appellant's brief, "this lately conceived exhibit" submitted to
jurors after the case was closed "precluded the Appellant's attor-
ney from examining witnesses relative to the exhibit and pre-
cluded him from discussing the exhibit in his argument to the
jury and was therefore prejudicial to the Appellant's case."' 9
Noting that "the presiding judge has great influence upon
the minds of the jurors, who are quick to seize upon any intimaj
tion by work [sic] or gesture from him,""0 the court agreed with
12. Id. at 520-21, 234 S.E.2d at 892.
13. Brief for Respondent at 1.
14. 234 S.C. 448, 108 S.E.2d 777 (1959).
15. 237 S.C. 167, 116 S.E.2d 22 (1960).
16. 244 S.C. 276, 136 S.E.2d 708 (1964).
17. Brief for Respondent at 3.
18. Id. at 4-8.
19. Brief for Appellants at 6.
20. 268 S.C. at 521, 234 S.E.2d at 892.
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the contentions set forth by the Players. Although no authority
was cited for its holding, the court stated that the likelihood of
prejudice from "the submission of the equivalent of an exhibit to
the jury, without the request of the jury and over the objection
of counsel for the boat owners, is sufficiently strong that a new
trial should be held.)
21
Muted criticism in Ballard may obscure the actual error per-
ceived by the supreme court. Although not mentioned in the
opinion, the constitutional provision that grants to trial judges
the authority to declare the law also states that a charge to a jury
is not to be oh the facts. 2 To a layman the trial judge's volunteer-
ing of a written summary of figures might appear to be a tacit
approval of the claims. The prejudicial fault in Ballard, then,
may lie not in the practice of using a blackboard to summarize,
but in the trial judge's actions that so powerfully influence jurors.
Ballard v. Rowe does not signal a retreat from supreme court
approval of blackboard use during trials. The opinion does not
criticize the practice of using blackboards to illustrate counsel's
argument or to clarify a witness' testimony. Instead, the court's
objection appears to be limited to the unorthodox use of a black-
board in the lower court. At trial, counsel could have requested
that the trial court exercise his discretion to re-open the case to
admit further evidence. 23 Had counsel made this request, the pro-
priety of the blackboard exhibit, whether figures listed were sup-
ported by sufficient evidence or not, could have been resolved
without the necessity of an appeal.
III. BUSINESS RECORDS: BEST EVIDENCE RULE AND HEARSAY
In the past a South Carolina practitioner could not rely on
uniformity in treatment of business records as evidence. Although
some lower courts and some supreme court decisions sanctioned
the admission of various business records, other cases made ad-
missibility uncertain. 4 Recognizing this problem, Professor
Dreher in 1967 called for the enactment of a uniform business
21. Id.
22. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 17.
23. As a matter of general law, a trial judge has discretion to re-open a case even after
the jury has begun deliberations. WIGMORE, supra note 7, at § 1880. See State v. Harrison,
236 S.C. 246, 113 S.E.2d 783 (1960) (case re-opened after close of testimony). See also
People v. Frohner, 65 Cal. App. 3d 94, 135 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1976) (holding that it was error
for the trial judge not to re-open the case after jurors had begun deliberations).
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records act.25 In 1977 the supreme court in Grand Strand Con-
struction Co. v. Graves26 clarified the status of the business re-
cords rule in South Carolina. One year later, the South Carolina
General Assembly provided specificity by enacting the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act.27
In Grand Strand the supreme court held that business re-
cords were admissible as evidence even though the permanent
ledger in question was not the original record of man hours spent
on the project and the record was hearsay. Appellant Grand
Strand Construction Company had contracted with respondents
to build a house with labor at a cost of six dollars per man hour.
Because respondents paid only $4500 for materials and labor, the
company sought to foreclose a mechanic's lien to recover an addi-
tional $6229.61 for labor.
At trial, in an attempt to prove the number of man hours
chargeable to respondents' account, the company introduced tes-
timony tracing the procedures used for recording man hours
worked on the job site and paying employees for their time
worked. The job foreman or a sub-foreman tabulated hours on
scraps of paper and gave the results to Grand Strand's secretary.
Normally a foreman handed these tabulations to the secretary or
slipped them under her office door, although he might at times
relay the totals by telephone. After entering the total hours into
a permanent ledger, the secretary discarded the scraps of paper.
She then disbursed to company employees payroll checks based
on the number of hours recorded in the ledger. Respondents ob-
jected when the ledger identified by Grand Strand's secretary was
offered into evidence. The lower court, finding that the ledger was
not a book of original entry, refused to admit it because of the
best evidence rule. Because Grand Strand was incapable of prov-
ing respondents' indebtedness, an involuntary nonsuit was
granted.
On appeal the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, finding that the trial court's refusal to admit Grand
Strand's ledger was "a manifest error of law and . . . an abuse
of discretion." ' The court held that the ledger was a book of
original entry constituting the best evidence of man hours charge-
able to respondents' account and noted that it would be a practi-
25. J. DREHER, A GUIDE To EVIDENCE LAW IN SouTH CAROLoNA 81 (1967).
26. 269 S.C. 594, 239 S.E.2d 81 (1977).
27. 1978 S.C. Acts 552. The text of the new act appears at note 34, infra.
28. 269 S.C. at 597, 239 S.E.2d at 82.
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cal denial of justice to make Grand Strand produce all scraps of
paper used to tabulate man hours.
The Grand Strand decision made South Carolina law on
business records and the best evidence rule consistent with gener-
ally accepted views of recognized authorities. 9 The best evidence
rule requires production of the original writing, but allows excuses
for non-production that typically are based on loss or destruction
of the original, its possession by a party beyond the jurisdiction
of the court, failure of an adversary having possession to produce
the original after notice, and statutory exceptions that allow cer-
tified copies of public records in lieu of the original. 0 As McCor-
mick noted, "[t]he production-of-documents rule is principally
aimed, not at securing a writing at all hazards and in every in-
stance, but at securing the best obtainable evidence of its con-
tents."'" That was precisely the problem faced by Grand Strand;
if not permitted to use the ledger as the best obtainable evidence
of the number of man hours, the company faced the very real
hazard of being unable to collect money due for labor provided
to the respondents.
In addition to the best evidence rule issue, the introduction
of business records also involves a hearsay problem. To deal with
the hearsay objection, the supreme court quoted from J.L. Mott
Iron Works v. Kaiser Co. 2 and stated that although a business
record admittedly is hearsay, it should be acceptable as a proper
exception to that rule. The common law generally has recognized
the business records exception because of the usual reliability and
accuracy of regularly kept books and records.
Grand Strand effectively eliminated any lingering doubts
about the existence of a business records rule in South Carolina
and provided a valuable precedent for admitting into evidence
regularly kept books of account. In most jurisdictions today ad-
missibility of regularly kept records is a matter of statutory law. '3
In South Carolina, however, until the 1978 enactment of the Uni-
form Business Records as Evidence Act,3" the practitioner was
29. E.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at §§ 229-30. Accord, 5 WIGMORE, supra note 7,
at §§ 1517-61.
30. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, §§ 237-40, at 570-75.
31. Id. § 237, at 570 (emphasis in original).
32. 131 S.C. 394, 103 S.E. 783 (1920), aff'd., 257 U.S. 240 (1920).
33. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 306, at 719-20.
34. In 1977 adoption of the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act and Uniform
Photographic Copies of Business and Public Records as Evidence Act was proposed to the
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forced to rely on precedents allowing the admission of business
records despite the hearsay and best evidence rules. Since June
30, 1978, the effective date of the new Uniform Business Records
as Evidence Act, the practitioner in South Carolina courts can
use the statute to admit a broader range of business records.
A brief comparison of a few major differences between the
new act and the federal rules of evidence may be useful. The
federal rules broaden the traditional definition of an "original"
and provide for admissibility of duplicates.s The second section
of the new South Carolina act allows the admission of photo-
graphic copies of business and public records but does not provide
for data compilations, such as computer print-outs. More closely
related to Grand Strand, the hearsay exception for regularly kept
2819, 102nd Gen. Ass. 1st Sess. (1977). This bill was enacted on June 30, 1978, 1978 S.C.
Acts 552, and reads as follows:
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina:
SECTION 1. The term "business" shall include every kind of business, profes-
sion, occupation, calling or operation of institutions, whether carried on for
profit or not.
A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar as relevant, be compe-
tent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity
and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of
business, at or near the time of the act, condition or event and if, in the opinion
of the court, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were
such as to justify its admission.
This section may be cited as the Uniform Business Records as Evidence
Act.
SECTION 2. If any business, institution, member of a profession or calling,
or any department or agency of government, in the regular course of business
or activity has kept or recorded any memorandum, writing, entry, print, repre-
sentation or combination thereof, of any act, transaction, occurrence or event,
and in the regular course of business has caused any or all of the same to be
recorded, copied or reproduced by any photographic, photostatic, microfilm,
microcard, miniature photographic or other process which accurately reprod-
uces or forms a durable medium for so reproducing the original, the original may
be destroyed in the regular course of business unless held in a custodial or
fiduciary capacity or unless its preservation is required by law. Such reproduc-
tion, when satisfactorily identified is as admissible in evidence as the original
itself in any judicial or administrative proceeding whether the original is in
existence or not and an enlargement or facsimile of such reproduction is likewise
admissible in evidence if the original reproduction is in existence and available
for inspection under direction of court. The introduction of a reproduced record,
enlargement or facsimile does not preclude admission of the original.
This section shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its gen-
eral purpose of making uniform the law of those states which enact or adopt it.
This section may be cited as the Uniform Photographic Copies of Business
and Public Records as Evidence Act.
SECTION 3. This act shall take effect upon approval by the Governor.
35. FED. R. Evm. 1001-05.
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records is broadened by both the federal rules and the Uniforl,.
Business Records as Evidence Act through an extension of the
traditional definition of business. The federal rule specifically
provides that opinions and diagnoses may be the subject of the
record, but the South Carolina statute includes only records of
acts, events, or conditions. An admissible record in the federal
courts must be linked to a person with knowledge, but the South
Carolina statute requires only that a custodian or other qualified
witness testify to the identity of the record and the manner of its
preparation. Both rules have clauses to allow for necessary excep-
tions. All deicribed records are admissible, according to the fed-
eral rule, unless circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthi-
ness.3" Records under the new South Carolina statute are compe-
tent evidence if, in the court's opinion, the circumstances of prep-
aration justify admission of the record.3" The South Carolina Uni-
form Business Records as Evidence Act should greatly facilitate
the admission of most business records into evidence at trial.
IV. EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES
Several cases were decided by the South Carolina Supreme
Court in 1977 concerning the admissibility of evidence of prior
crimes. The issue is especially problematic when a witness is the
defendant in a criminal trial because of the likely prejudicial
effect on the jury hearing evidence of prior crimes. Although evi-
dence of prior crimes is admissible merely on the issue of the
accused's credibility and a limited number of other issues," jurors
might infer that the accused has bad character disposing him
toward commission of the crime charged.
In State v. Conyers9 appellant was convicted of murder in
the arsenic poisoning of her second husband. The supreme court
held that it was clearly prejudicial error to admit testimony to
show that appellant had also poisoned her first husband when
evidence of the earlier crime was not clear and convincing. At
trial the state introduced evidence of the poisoning of appellant's
son-in-law, mother-in-law, first husband, and a potential busi-
ness partner. The state then offered evidence that appellant had
administered arsenic to each victim in an attempt to show appel-
36. Id. 803(6).
37. Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, § 1, 1978 S.C. Acts 552.
38. For general background in the area of admissibility of prior crimes, see 3A
WIGMORE, supra n.7, at §§ 926, 980; McCoRMIcK, supra n.6, at §§ 43, 190.
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lant's motive, knowledge, intent, plan or scheme.
On appeal, appellant argued that the evidence was inadmis-
sible because it related to crimes other than the one for which she
was on trial and that even if otherwise admissible, the other
crimes were not established by the necessary degree of proof. The
court stated the general rule that evidence of prior crimes inde-
pendent of and unconnected with the one for which the accused
is on trial is inadmissible. Citing State v. Thompson," State v.
Gregory,4 and State v. Lyle," the court noted recognized excep-
tions allowing testimony of prior crimes if it directly supports a
"substantial element of the State's case, as where the purpose is
to prove motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, a com-
mon scheme or plan embracing several crimes so related to each
other that proof of one tends to establish the other, and the iden-
tity of the wrongdoer."43
The most significant requirement espoused in Conyers was
that, because of potential prejudice from testimony of prior
crimes, proof of the other crime under one of the exceptions must
be clear and convincing." The court failed to find clear and con-
vincing proof that appellant poisoned her first husband because,
although his body did contain high levels of arsenic, the evidence
was insufficient to prove that appellant was the one responsible.
Because admission of testimony concerning her first husband's
poisoning was clearly prejudicial, the court reversed the convic-
tion and ordered a new trial.
Although the court in Conyers mentioned State v. Lyle in
determining that the proper standard for proof of the prior crime
was clear and convincing evidence, the Lyle court actually had
stated that the court must clearly perceive a connection between
the extraneous criminal transaction and the crime charged. These
two related standards must both be met before evidence of prior
crimes is admissable. The South Carolina practitioner should
note these requirements, particularly because the court has ali
40. 230 S.C. 473, 96 S.E.2d 471 (1957).
41. 191 S.C. 212, 4 S.E.2d 1 (1939).
42. 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923). For an interesting discussion of Thompson,
Gregory, Lyle, and other cases in this area, see Reiser, Evidence of Other Criminal Acts
in South Carolina 28 S.C.L. REv. 125 (1976).
43. 268 S.C. at 280, 233 S.E.2d at 96.
44. Id. Compare with this requirement, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision
in Watkins v. Foster, No. 77-1014 (4th Cir. Jan. 26, 1978), which arose out of a crime
occurring in North Carolina. The court required that questioning the accused about other
alleged crimes must be in good faith.
1979] EVIDENCE
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ready applied the Conyers clear and convincing standard in a
recent case.45
In State v. Lee 6 the appellant questioned whether the solici-
tor's dwelling on the phrase "crime of moral turpitude" exceeded
a permissible attack on the witness' credibility and became an
impermissible attack on his character. The appellant had been
convicted of rape in 1962 and had been paroled just prior to the
time of the rape for which he was on trial. Before the case was
tried, the trial judge ruled that the solicitor could attempt to
impeach the appellant by asking only whether he had ever been
convicted of a crime of moral turpitude. During the trial, al-
though his conviction and parole were discussed on direct and
cross-examination of the accused, it was never specified that the
crime of moral turpitude was rape.
On appeal the appellant asserted that some of the solicitor's
references to the prior conviction during closing arguments
amounted to an attack on his character and that the jurors may
have considered the prior conviction as substantive evidence of
the rape for which he was on trial. One part of the argument that
appellant believed to be objectionable was the solicitor's state-
ment that the accused was a menace to society, stressing his
conviction of a crime of moral turpitude.
The court restated the rule that a prior conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude may be used to impeach a defendant-
witness' credibility, provided the conviction is not too remote in
time.47 After reviewing sections of the solicitor's argument to the
jury, the justices held that the solicitor did not exceed the proper
scope of inquiry and argument concerning appellant's credibility.
Specifically answering one point of appellant's argument, the
court stated "that appellant was a 'menace to society' was im-
plicit in the fact of his prior conviction for a crime of moral turpi-
tude and he sustained no prejudice by the solicitor's use of that
phrase."48 Finding remaining exceptions without merit as well,
the court affirmed the conviction.
In addition to the proper scope of the argument with crimes
of moral turpitude the South Carolina Supreme Court also con-
sidered the types of crimes that reflect moral turpitude. State v.
45. State v. Hammond, - S.C. ., 242 S.E.2d 411 (1978).
46. 269 S.C. 421, 237 S.E.2d 768 (1977).
47. See State v. Vaughn, 268 S.C. 119, 232 S.E.2d 328 (1977).
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Carriker9 differed from those cases already considered because
the witness in Carriker was not the accused. In appellant's trial
for armed robbery, a key state's witness had a previous conviction
of possession of drugs without a prescription. The trial judge,
however, refused to allow cross-examination of the witness about
the offense, and on appeal appellant asserted that the refusal was
error.
The brief appellate decision stated that the question is lim-
ited to whether mere possession of stimulant drugs without a
prescription is a crime of moral turpitude, which is the only crime
that is admissible for impeachment. The court held it was not a
crime of moral turpitude, but specifically limited the holding to
the illegal possession of drugs that may be obtained legally with
a valid prescription. The court held that the trial judge did not
err in refusing to allow cross-examination of the witness on this
prior offense and the conviction was affirmed.
Certain differences should be noted between practice in fed-
eral courts and South Carolina courts in this area." In compari-
son to state court practices, the federal rules contain more safe-
guards to shield defendants with prior convictions. Whereas
South Carolina courts permit evidence of all crimes of moral tur-
pitude, the federal system limits the use to (1) crimes punishable
by death or imprisonment longer than one year if the court be-
lieves its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, or (2)
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement, regardless of pen-
alties. South Carolina case law requires only that a conviction
used to impeach not be too remote in time. Specific requirements,
basically excluding crimes if more than ten years have passed
since the prior conviction or imprisonment, are found in the fed-
eral rule.5 ' The practitioner will note that South Carolina practice
generally permits more extensive use of evidence of prior crimes
than the Federal Rules.
Margaret E. Thorp
49. 269 S.C. 553, 238 S.E.2d 678 (1977).
50. In general, South Carolina case law recognizes that evidence of prior crimes may
be admitted to prove motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme
or plan, and the identity of the offender. The Federal Rules provide an open-ended list
that includes proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
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